properties of the living being are due to the presence and working in it of something, some force, energy, principle, factor or agent, of a nature radically different from any that is to be found in the inanimate realm. As we shall see, there is at least one modern doctrine of which it is difficult to say whether or no it is a form of vitalism as defined above. Yet in spite of that, this definition of vitalism does render the word capable of precise usage for the classification of theories. If we accept this definition, it follows that all possible views or theories about X fall into two great classes : the vitalistic and the non-vitalistic. Let us note that this division does not coincide with the division into the non-materialistic and the materialistic, nor yet with that into the non-mechanistic and the mechanistic. It does make of vitalism a very comprehensive class of theories. Vitalism as thus defined, instead of being a debased, timid and useless variety of animism, becomes a whole class of theories, a class which includes animism in all its varieties. It becomes almost synonymous with the word ' dualism '; but is more comprehensive; for, as I have already mentioned, there are forms of vitalism which postulate more than two constituents of human personality of radically and fundamentally different natures.

Returning now to our historical sketch of the flourishing of the mechanical biology, we note that, although in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were writers, like La Mettrie and Mandeville, who delighted

in shocking the *bourgeois* by expounding, in fanciful
sketches of man as a machine, the mechanical physiology
suggested by Descartes, the majority of the biologists,
md especially its leading figures, such as Cuvier, Buffon,